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ABSTRACT 
Immense natural resource wealth lies buried within Afghan soil. The potential revenue 
stream resulting from the extraction of minerals and hydrocarbons from the country has 
been identified as a replacement for international aid and ultimately as a catalyst for self-
sustaining economic growth. Political instability and the potential adverse effects of 
resource abundance in underdeveloped countries, however, pose challenges to this 
assertion.   
Afghanistan’s long history of aid dependence is used as a proxy measure in this 
study to assess the impact of large revenue streams on political and economic institutions. 
While research found that foreign aid had a detrimental effect on institutional quality 
within Afghanistan, the study also determined that a critical difference exists between the 
method in which aid was dispersed, and the manner in which large-scale resource 
revenue payouts will necessarily occur within the country.  
Initial observations suggest that the realization of the country’s economic 
potential has positively affected government institutions charged with developing the 
mining sector. While analysis of aid programs in the country shows flaws in governance 
and monetary policies, there are indications that the incentives induced by the emerging 
mining sector have triggered a shift toward a future-oriented development strategy 
amongst political and economic leaders.   
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I. THE IMPACT OF RESOURCE WEALTH ON ECONOMIC 
GROWTH, GOVERNANCE, AND CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN  
Located at the collision point of the Eurasian and Indian continental plates, 
Afghanistan sits on some of the most diverse and difficult terrain in the world. The Hindu 
Kush range in the country’s northeast juts 20,000 feet into the troposphere, while the 
southwest portion of the county comprises an arid plateau that barely averages 3,000 feet 
above sea level. It is what lies beneath the twisted terrain, however, that is attracting 
billions of dollars in investment capital from Central and East Asian powers. 
Afghanistan’s natural-resource wealth is as diverse as its landscape—untapped deposits 
of copper, iron ore, gold, zinc, uranium, oil and natural gas all abound—in massive 
quantities. Pentagon estimates place the value at more than U.S. $1 trillion.1 
A. CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION 
How is natural-resource wealth shaping government and economic institutions 
within Afghanistan? What effects do these institutional changes indicate for 
Afghanistan’s economic growth, level of conflict, and stability?    
B. IMPORTANCE   
Afghanistan’s future is at a precarious crossroad. Natural resources have the 
potential to bring stability and prosperity to the nation, resulting in ancillary geostrategic 
benefits to the region and beyond. Continued instability in the region, however, will keep 
Afghanistan isolated from global markets, limit its economic growth potential, and 
perpetuate the prevailing cycle of poor governance. A keen understanding of the 
relationship between resource extraction and its effect on government institutions is an 
essential forerunner to any successful future strategy. Natural resource dependence will 
also have effects on Afghanistan’s domestic political stability, as described in the 
literature review below. 
                                                
1 James Risen, “U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan,” The New York Times, June 13, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html?pagewanted=all 
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Afghanistan’s central location on the Asian continent has placed its resource 
wealth directly in the crosshairs of the rapidly expanding Chinese and Indian economies. 
Past Chinese business practices in Afghanistan and Africa have shown that they are 
willing to lower their ethical standards to that of their host nation, with the rural 
population of those countries often disproportionately affected by the environmental 
destruction and harsh labor conditions that result from poor oversight and accountability. 
As Afghanistan’s mineral extraction industry is in its initial stages of development, it is 
essential to determine the trajectory upon which the current stewards of these resources 
have placed the country.  
From a national security perspective, the United States has once before paid the 
price for ignoring the Afghan people when it was falsely assumed U.S. interests had been 
met in the region following the Soviet defeat in 1989. A decade of Soviet hostilities 
destroyed both formal government and traditional dispute mechanisms, creating an 
unstable power vacuum left for the Afghans to sort out. What resulted was truly a lose-
lose arrangement—while Afghans were subject to draconian rule under the Taliban, 
extremist non-state actors with maximalist goals found sanctuary in a region filled with 
disaffected citizens now neglected by the Western world. Going forward, a significant 
portion of the U.S.’s national security rests on a stable and productive Afghan society that 
can secure its borders, insulate its population, and deliver the good governance and 
economic outcomes to sustain the population’s livelihoods and well-being.    
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The central problem Afghanistan’s mineral wealth poses is suggested by dense 
amounts of literature indicating a “resource curse,” where countries with high ratios of 
primary exports to gross domestic product (GDP) tend to have slower economic growth 
and higher levels of corruption and conflict.2  While the U.S. draws down its security 
presence in the country, the game is already on to exploit the nation’s buried wealth. Both 
                                                
2 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth,” 
NBER Working Paper no. 5398. National Bureau of Economic Research, December 1995; Michael L. 
Ross, “What Do We Really Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?” Journal of Peace Research 41, 
no. 3 (May 2004): 337–356. doi: 10.1177/0022343304043773. 
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China and India have signed multi-billion dollar contracts for extraction rights to 
Afghanistan’s preeminent copper and iron ore sites, respectively. In January of 2013, the 
Chinese National Petroleum Company began pumping crude from its 25-year tender in 
the oil-rich northwest of the country.   
Although the small and medium-scale extraction is well underway, many 
ancillary questions remain. It is still unclear how Afghanistan’s emerging mineral sector 
will affect its economic growth, level of conflict, and political stability. How were these 
contracts negotiated? What were the bidding criteria? How and why were these countries 
and their state-run enterprises selected to establish the foundation of large-scale 
extraction in Afghanistan? How are political and economic actors shaping Afghanistan’s 
resource extraction strategy? Most importantly, have the interests of the Afghan citizens 
been considered in the drive to exploit the countries natural resources? Investigating these 
questions will portend the future benefit resources will have on economic growth and 
stability in Afghanistan.  
The nature of the problems researched in this thesis requires a significant reliance 
on perceptions-based governance indicators to formulate a measure of state effectiveness. 
This form of analysis comes with inherent drawbacks due to ill-defined limitations and 
imprecise margins for error associated with qualitative type inquiries. Key indexes such 
as the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the World Bank’s World Wide Governance 
Indicator (WGI) draw from large pools of opinion throughout a range of issues affecting 
a given society. The opinions and perceptions are then used to create a single score from 
the aggregate data. Specific problems affecting the accuracy of this method of scoring 
and ranking individual countries arises from: 1) potential hidden biases amongst 
respondents; 2) the data are often not publicly available and therefor does not lend itself 
to transparency, leading to; 3) lack of ability by a third party to replicate the results, and; 
4) the subjective nature of the data are not backed up by any concrete theory of what 
comprises “good” and “bad” governance.3 
                                                
3 Charles P. Oman and Christiane Ardnt, “Measuring Governance.” OECD Development Centre 
Policy Brief 39 (October 27, 2010), 11. doi: 10.1787/20771681. 
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Despite the limitations and drawbacks of qualitative governance indicators, these 
metrics provide valuable information concerning society’s approval of leadership at the 
local, regional, and national level. In the natural resource extraction industry, where the 
social license to operate relies heavily on local acceptance, these indicators can provide a 
strong measure of the potential success of particular projects from region to region. While 
perfect governance indicators do not exist, the broad level of aggregate data and 
sophisticated measurement techniques used by leading indexes provides the best insight 
into governance quality currently available.   
The hypotheses laid out below are intended to examine whether natural resources 
are likely to have a positive impact on Afghan government institutions, such as in the 
case of Botswana, or negative, as in the case of The Democratic Republic of Congo.      
1. Hypothesis 1 
Extraction of Afghanistan’s natural resources continues but poor-quality central 
governance remains in place. Poor economic and government institutions become mutually 
reinforcing, leading to a continuation of corruption, exclusive economic opportunity, and 
elitist rule. The Afghan economy grows resource dependent, and the economy stagnates. In 
this scenario GDP growth will fail to reduce the country’s poverty level.   
2. Hypothesis 2 
Existing mineral sites become a source for territorial dispute and insurgent 
financing. Civil unrest in Afghanistan intensifies post 2014 security force pull out. 
Foreign investment is curtailed due to instability and the natural resource sector remains 
largely undeveloped.    
3. Hypothesis 3  
Realization of the potential for significant natural resource revenues drives 
government accountability and transparency initiatives in order to attract foreign 
investment to Afghanistan’s mineral sector. Resource extraction becomes Afghanistan’s 
economic leading sector resulting in resource corridors, spinoff-business creation, and 
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sustained long-term growth and stability. This scenario will be characterized by sustained 
GDP growth, poverty reduction, and the evolution of a complex division of labor.  
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The investigation method to address the proposed research question takes a 
systematic case-study approach using available data from The World Bank, Transparency 
International, Bertelsmann-Stiftung, Revenue Watch, and other agencies to examine two 
key bastions of stability: 1) governance and institutional quality, and 2) public service 
and finance mechanisms as they relate to Afghanistan. The analysis will focus on the 
current resource extractive policies set forth by the Afghan Ministry of Mines (MoM). 
The MoM’s role in tendering mineral deposits and structuring contracts is crucial in 
realizing Afghanistan’s full resource potential. As such, scrutinizing their current policies 
through the lens of industry best practices will determine if the ministry’s initial 
management ethos positively affects economic and governmental mechanisms 
downstream. 
To get a sense of how the MoM’s current policies play into the larger scheme of 
future stability in Afghanistan, the investigation will take a broad look at leading theories 
on natural resources and economic development, governance and failed state dynamics, 
and resource-driven conflict. An overall view of the interplay between natural resource 
revenues and state institutions that have transpired elsewhere will provide an 
understanding of the dynamics Afghanistan faces, and help craft likely outcomes for the 
country going forward.  
This study will consider indicators of state performance, economic growth, and 
quality of life. The relationship between GDP and poverty rates is one particularly 
important measure. A growing economy with no appreciable reduction in poverty 
indicates a failure of the state-citizen compact. Levels of violence will signal the state’s 
ability to address grievances and provide basic services.   
Large-scale resource extraction is in its infancy in Afghanistan and as such rent 
capture, taxation, and investment policies of the nation remain largely untested. 
Similarly, the government of Afghanistan’s ability to absorb and distribute natural 
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resource revenue remains unproven pending future investment and growth in the 
extractives industry. Being a heavily aid-dependent state, however, an analysis of 
economic aid streams into the country over the past decade can provide a fair 
approximation of how Afghan government institutions have historically managed income 
flows. Lessons learned from the influx of donor money, implementation of aid driven 
projects, and transparency practices can point to areas needing improvement prior to 
additional large-scale mining operations coming on line. 
The ultimate goal of the case study being an understanding how resource rents 
will shape Afghanistan’s economic and political institutions, a detailed survey of the 
country’s historical context is essential. As Naazneen Barma et al. point out in “Rents to 
Riches? The Political Economy of Resource Led Development,” the causal arrow runs 
both ways between the economic sector and state institutions. Resource rents shape the 
economic policies set forth by political elites, and these policies in turn determine a 
country’s propensity for resource dependence.4 This back and forth sets countries on 
continuously evolving trajectories, which can be either beneficial or detrimental to 
economic health. This being the case, it becomes clear that sound governance is crucial to 
a successful extractive industry. Analysis of current and past leaders and the forms of rule 
successful in Afghanistan then, plays a key role determining the impact of Kabul’s 
reaction to the mining sector. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I introduces the central research question and the impact of the 
investigation as it relates to United States interests. The research methodology and topics 
of inquiry are set forth as well as the general format of the thesis. 
Chapter II presents a literature review of theories relevant to the study—
specifically, competing theories of economic development and natural resource 
abundance, governance, failed state dynamics, and Afghan culture and history. The 
section will briefly present findings from past case study analysis undertaken in 
                                                
4 Naazneen H. Barma, Kai Kaiser, Tuan Minh Le, Lorena Viñuela, “Rents to Riches? The Political 
Economy of Natural Resource-Led Development,” (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), 10. 
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Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and other 
resource-dependent and resource abundant countries to identify the relationships between 
resources and economic growth and political stability. 
Chapter III provides a historical background and context of the Afghan State. The 
section seeks to paint a picture of the social and political environment in which the 
emerging extractives industry must operate. What are the effects of Afghanistan’s ethnic 
fault lines on designing and approving mining legislation? Are traditional tribal networks 
vestiges of the past or underlying drivers for policy makers?  
Chapter IV goes through a quantitative evaluation of the Afghan society’s 
reaction to the past 12 years of foreign occupation and how various aid driven 
development programs have affected progress toward stability. Results from this study of 
the effects of aid trends will serve as an analogy to the potential effects of resource rents 
on stability, conflict, and government corruption at the local and state level.   
Chapter V delves into the state of the current Afghan extractives industry—
specifically, the resources at play, the infrastructure in place, and obstacles to extraction. 
Additionally, this line of inquiry will center on the MoM’s mission and vision, bidding 
process and contract structuring, transparency initiatives, and relationship with the World 
Bank. What is the basis for policies set forth and what constraints does the ministry 
operate under? How will these dynamics affect future contract negotiations and foreign 
investment? The chapter will assess the MoM’s performance to date, with a particular 
focus on how the different commercial, government, and Afghan civil society and 
political actors interact over natural resource extraction and revenue distribution.     
Chapter VI concludes with the findings thus far of Afghanistan’s core economic 
and government institutions. Key points from each of the chapters, when linked, aim to 
show how the Afghan government will react to natural resource extractive sector and 
what effect this will have on stability and economic growth. The thesis will end with a 
few brief policy implications. 
 
 8 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature considered for this case analysis is broken down into four fields: 
impacts of natural resources on economic growth, stability, and conflict; governance and 
failed state dynamics; institutions and institutional change; and Afghan culture and 
history.  
A. NATURAL RESOURCE EFFECTS 
The initial academic research on the effects of natural resources centered on their 
seemingly negative impact to economic growth, a dynamic referred to as the “resource 
curse.” The seminal finding on the negative association between resource abundance and 
slow economic growth was advanced in work by Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. 
Warner, where evidence showed slow growth rates between 1971–1989 for countries 
possessing high ratios of primary exports compared with GDP.5 
Sachs and Warner explain their counterintuitive findings as likely resulting from a 
dynamic version of “Dutch disease,” where high levels of natural resources drives a 
higher demand for non-tradable goods, such as services.6 Due to inflated wages, the 
manufacturing sector suffers as labor and capital flee the industry, creating a further 
reliance on natural resource exports. Sachs puts forward several hypotheses explaining 
the link between Dutch Disease and slow economic growth. First is a simple explanation 
from the 14th century suggesting that easy riches lead to apathy, the logic being that 
inherent wealth is detrimental to ingenuity and work ethic. Second is the idea that 
abundant natural resources lead to a “feeding frenzy,” where competing factions squabble 
over resource revenue to the detriment of society. Last, is the economic argument that a 
robust manufacturing sector, not resource exports, leads to a more complex division of 
labor in the long term, which in turn leads to a higher standard of living for the society as 
a whole.7   
                                                
5 Sachs and Warner, “Natural Resource,” 2. 
6 Ibid., 21. 
7 Sachs and Warner, “Natural Resource,” 5. 
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Later scholarship on the resource curse has pointed to potential flaws in the 
Sachs-Warner study stemming from the fundamental distinction between resource 
abundance versus resource dependence. Previous studies pointing to an inverse 
relationship between resources and slow growth focused on high ratios of resource 
exports versus innate natural resource abundance. When resource dependent countries—
those with high ratios of primary exports to GDP—were examined, the negative 
relationship held. However, under the World Bank’s criteria for natural resource wealth, 
where the measurement is based off per capita mineral deposits, there was actually a 
positive relationship between resource abundance and economic growth among countries 
studied from 1970 to 2000.8  
More recent literature covering the resource curse focuses on the quality of state 
institutions within resource dependent countries as the variable for determining economic 
growth.  Researcher Christa N. Brunnschweiler conducted a study using the rule of law 
and government effectiveness as indicators of institutional quality.9 Analysis of data for 
102 selected countries shows a positive association between quality of institutions and 
economic growth. The study confirms earlier results from Daron Acemoglu et al. in 2000, 
indicating that good institutional quality positively affects per capita income levels.10  
While Brunnschweiler found no confirmation that resource wealth negatively 
affects institutional quality, other works suggest a link. Terry Lynn Karl argues in her 
work, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, that a reciprocal and 
continuous relationship exists between state institutions and the economic sector, which 
over time shapes the evolution of both organizations toward either productive or stunted 
outcomes.11 Barma et al. found resource-dependent countries score lower in institutional 
quality when compared with non-dependent countries of comparable GDP. Increases in 
                                                
8 Christa N. Brunnschweiler, “Cursing the Blessings? Natural Resource Abundance, Institutions, and 
Economic Growth,” World Development 36, no. 3 (March 2008), 400. 
9 Ibid., 404. 
10 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation,” NBER Working Paper no. 7771, June 2000, National Bureau 
of Economic Research, 23. 
11 Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1997), 6. 
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GDP resulting from resource revenue were found to not have a corresponding value 
added in terms of institutional quality.12 The piece additionally contends that, “How a 
state extracts, collects, utilizes, and distributes revenues defines its nature,” backing 
Karl’s assertion.13 
In Beyond the Resource Curse, Barma et al., define two ways in which natural 
resources interact with governance and state institutions: first, extraction of resources 
may erode quality of governance by creating political competition over control of 
resource revenues and; second, resource abundance, regardless of weakening governance, 
will shape the institutions and economic policies charged with managing the extraction 
process.14 Further, the chapter identifies leading hypotheses describing conditions when a 
resource curse is more likely to take hold: 1) when natural resources constitute the “only 
game in town”; 2) the distribution of resource rents aligns with existing political-
economic cleavages; 3) political power is concentrated in the executive, and; 4) policy 
commitment is made more difficult by price volatility or political instability.15  
The conditions listed above are particularly relevant to this case study as it can be 
argued that Afghanistan currently exhibits all four elements to varying degrees, 
ostensibly making the country acutely susceptible to the resource curse. A number of 
scholars including Barma have argued, however, that through careful management 
resource rich nations can escape impediments associated with mineral wealth. Barma’s 
study, for example, points out that considering a state’s resource management tactics 
against a standard best practices framework can objectively determine the quality of 
government and institutional arrangements within the mineral extraction sector.16 
Considering the logic that high quality institutions produce positive economic growth, an 
                                                
12  “Rents to Riches? The Political Economy of Natural Resource-Led Development,” 44.  
13 Ibid., 41. 
14 Naazneen H. Barma, “Petroleum, Governance, and Fragility: The Micro-Politics of Petroleum in 
Postconflict States,” Beyond the Resource Curse, ed. Brenda Shaffer and Taleh Ziyadov (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 333. 
15 Ibid., 332. 
16 Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds, Escaping the Resource Curse. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
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objective measure of governance and state institutions is vital. Barma’s particular report 
uses the “resource value chain,” devised by the World Bank, as its model framework for 
judging the extraction process.17 Consisting of four distinct steps along the path from 
minerals in the ground to the public investment of mineral rents—Contract awards, 
regulation of operations, rent collection, and revenue distribution—the value chain 
framework, when grounded contextually, serves as the basis for identifying a series of 
institutional and good governance practices within resource extractive countries.18 
B. INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
While opinions vary on the impact of resource curse causality—whether slow 
growth stems from abundance or dependence, and how this dependence affects growth, 
stability, etc.—as argued above, this study advances the idea that good quality 
governance can prevent the resource curse from taking hold regardless of any particular 
causal mechanism. This being the case, societal institutions that underpin government 
and economic policy become a central variable in determining successful mineral 
extraction policies and ultimately economic viability. It is therefore important in this 
course of research to understand the interplay between institutions, governance, political 
stability, and economic growth.  
Economist Douglas North describes institutions as a series of societal developed 
constraints, which shape interpersonal relations. In essence they are the “rules of the 
game in society.”19 North breaks institutions into two categories consisting of formal and 
informal types. Formal institutions are those rules expressly created by policymakers 
such as laws and regulations that seek to guide and confine human behavior. Informal 
institutions on the other hand, are those constraints arising from tradition such as cultural 
norms and customs.  
                                                
17 Barma, “Petroleum, Governance,” 334. Adapted from Eleodoro Mayorga Alba, “Extractive 
Industries Value Chain: A Comprehensive Integrated Approach to Developing Extractive Industries,” 
Africa Region Working Paper Series no. 125, Oil, Gas, and Mining Policy Division, The World Bank, 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009).  
18 Barma et al., “Rents to Riches?” 
19 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, (Cambridge, 
MA: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3. 
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The utility of both formal and informal institutions lie in their ability to provide 
structure and ultimately reduce uncertainty in everyday life. This measure of stability in 
everyday life plays a large role in determining whether institutions evolve in a manner 
that produces efficient or inefficient interactions within society, while a society’s ability 
to adapt is largely determined by the flexibility of existing institutions and society’s 
attachment to past cultural norms.20  A society that can more easily adapt its rules of the 
game, North argues, is better positioned to take advantage of the opportunities provided 
through the adoption of more efficient means of transaction.21  
North cites the example of the United States in the 19th century to illustrate the 
effect of institutions on the evolution of society. By incentivizing hard work and enacting 
appropriate alternative consequences, productive organizations prevailed and institutions 
in the U.S. evolved toward efficiency. Conversely, it is pointed out that many third world 
countries such as Nigeria and the DRC suffer from an application of reverse incentives 
placed on the majority of society, causing these countries to veer instead toward 
exclusive and inefficient means of governance.22        
While North believes that institutional change occurs incrementally, and results 
when entrepreneurs in the political and economic sector are persuaded that change will 
deliver personal benefit, scholarship by Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart presents a 
different take. The pair holds that through national development programs such as 
Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program (NSP), institutional change can occur 
relatively rapidly.23 Ghani and Lockhart demonstrate that good national programs can 
position local stakeholders around formal institutional rule at the grassroots level. In the 
case of the NSP, the program established a mechanism that rewarded local leaders and 
citizens alike with development funds when they adhered to a formal framework of 
                                                
20 North, Institutions, Institutional, 9; Douglass C. North, “The Role of Institutions in Economic 
Development,” UNECE Discussion Paper Series 2003.2, United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, October 2003, 2–7. 
21 North, Institutions, Institutional, 9. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured 
World, (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2009), 205. 
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regulations. Establishing this link with a series of carrot and stick measures empowered 
communities toward adopting more efficient means of local governance and social 
organization.  
 Although Afghanistan drafted a new constitution in 2004, informal change in the 
nation has remained largely static as evidenced by the extent to which tribal customs and 
norms prevail throughout the country. Due to their imbedded nature, North asserts that 
informal institutions are more resilient to change within society than formal, a posit 
which certainly holds in the Afghan example—30 years of political upheaval have made 
traditional tribal norms the prime means for many Afghans to make order out of a chaotic 
society. The stubborn nature of Afghan social and cultural institutions seems to present 
an obstacle to the evolution of efficient mechanisms for economic growth and 
opportunity. Given Afghanistan’s culture of systemic corruption and patronage, the 
preceding literature suggests that a significant level of institutional change is necessary 
before policies can be enacted and measures taken to avoid the resource curse. 
C. GOVERNANCE AND FAILED STATE DYNAMICS  
Contemporary literature on failed states largely focuses on government 
institutions and the nature of their functions. The literature reviewed acknowledges that 
institutions lie at the root of state failure, yet frame fundamentals of governance and 
solutions for failed states in different terms. In Fixing Failed States, Ghani and Lockhart 
contend that a primary function of the state is to connect its citizens to the global stock of 
wealth and knowledge. The measure of state viability lies in its citizen’s level of 
satisfaction in the performance of core government functions such as security, dispute 
resolution, and basic health care services that facilitate one’s ability to partake in the 
global market. The key to fixing failed states lies in the idea of “coproduction,” a term 
Ghani and Lockhart use to describe their view that state building involves both internal 
and external state actors.24 The resulting framework is a “double compact,” between the 
state and its citizens on one hand, and the state and the international community on the 
other, the latter providing assistance and oversight.  
                                                
24 Ghani and Lockhart, Fixing Failed States, 8. 
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Daren Acemoglu and James Robinson also assert the idea that a state’s 
institutional makeup determines success or failure. Their recent book, Why Nations Fail, 
describes how governments can be broken into two camps, those with “inclusive” 
institutions and those with “extractive” institutions.25 Extractive nations are geared 
toward serving the elite—industries are controlled by a few, and property rights are not 
honored. These states fail because their citizens are not given the incentive to save, 
invest, and innovate. Further, economic and political institutions depend on each other for 
survival; an extractive government cannot exist in a state with an inclusive economy and 
vice versa. These mutually reinforcing relationships lead societies into either vicious or 
virtuous cycles of development. The conclusion is that extractive governments are more 
likely to suffer the adverse effects of natural resource abundance. 
The Institute for State Effectiveness agrees with the concept of coproduction 
forwarded by Ghani and Lockhart stating in its governance manual, “A double compact 
of rights and responsibilities between citizen and state on the one hand, and between the 
state and its international partners on the other, can be therefore be helpful” (in creating 
prosperity and stability).26 The manual also points out however, that elites within corrupt 
systems often eschew institutional change because of the threat it poses to their personal 
wealth and monopoly of power. Following this line of reasoning then, it becomes 
apparent that the government in Kabul, bestowed with immense resource wealth, may 
pose a significant obstacle to the creation of inclusive institutions and state-society 
compacts needed to fix Afghanistan.  
D. AFGHAN CULTURE AND HISTORY  
Understanding Afghanistan’s cultural context is essential to successfully analyze 
the country’s response to significant changes in economic and political institutions that 
the discovery of resource abundance brings. There are numerous sources providing 
historical and cultural context on Afghanistan. For the purposes of this review, however, 
                                                25  Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, 
and Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012), 73. 
26  The Institute for State Effectiveness, “ISE Manuals & Toolkit Series, ISE Governance Manual,” 
(n.d.), http://www.effectivestates.org/resources.htm, 52. 
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those addressing the traditional roots of conflict and civil unrest are the focus. Empirical 
evidence points to relative peace and stability in Afghanistan as coinciding with periods 
of strong decentralized rule. Anthropologist and Afghan expert Thomas Barfield 
characterizes the Musahiban period between 1929–1978, the most peaceful time in the 
last century, as a time when leaders proclaimed their rule in theory, but realized enforcing 
such a notion was both undesirable and impractical.27 Conversely, eras where wholesale 
change was attempted—King Ananullah in the early 20th century, the Peoples 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan 1978–89, and most recently the Taliban—have resulted 
in civil unrest and conflict. 
While Barfield and others focus on ideological dimensions of civil strife, e.g., 
Marxists versus Islamists, social scientist David B. Edwards presents a theory that 
explains Afghan conflict occurring on a more fundamental level. In his words, 
“Afghanistan’s troubles derive less from divisions between groups or from the ambitious 
strivings of particular individuals then they do from the moral incoherence of 
Afghanistan itself.”28 Edward’s central thesis rests on the idea that traditional tribal 
values in Afghan society, such as revenge and honor based actions, are in many respects 
incompatible with Islam and universal rule. The resulting contradiction is a conflicted 
society often in a state of unrest. 
Afghan society remains ethnically and tribally fractured. While the effect of this 
fractionalize on the present state of resource wealth in Afghanistan is yet determined, 
literature analyzing the effect in other countries from Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler 
ostensibly points to a likely increase in civil conflict in the presence of natural resource 
abundance. These scholars cite low opportunity cost for rebellion and poor government 
                                                
27 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2010), 337–351. 
28 David B. Edwards, Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier, (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1996), 3. 
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institutions as two of the more prominent explanations for the positive association 
between natural resources and conflict.29 
The low opportunity cost explanation derives from the economic argument that 
resource dependence leads to low economic growth and higher poverty rates. 
Impoverished citizens and separatist elements within society in turn have little to loose 
and much to gain by engaging in civil strife. Conversely, economic opportunity raises the 
cost of participating in conflict resulting in a more stable society. The poor governance 
theory derives from several potential resource linkages including “greed” and 
“grievance” explanations.30 The greed model asserts that insurgents are motivated by 
personal gain. Territorial disputes flare as a result of the struggle to control resource rich 
areas. The grievance theory holds that rebellion against the state is more likely in 
societies where social exclusion and oppression prevail.  
One of the difficulties in establishing causal links between natural resource 
abundance and conflict results from the fact that the mechanisms described above are not 
mutually independent of one another and can exist simultaneously within a given society. 
For instance, a resource dependent country that also suffers from poor governance would 
logically support both a low opportunity costs for rebellion, and a high grievance factor, 
creating an unclear causal link. In addition, low opportunity cost and political grievance 
can exist independent of resource abundance, further obscuring a clear link. 
Research from Brunnschweiler and Bulte furthers the debate between resources 
and conflict by accounting for ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences within a 
resource rich country. The study’s conclusion differs from that of Collier and Hoeffler 
and other scholars who draw links between resource wealth and conflict. Brunnschweiler 
and Bulte found that the direct effect of resource wealth tends to actually attenuate the 
                                                
29 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Democracy and Resource Rents,” Working Papers, GPRG-WPS-
016, 2005, University of Oxford, Department of Economics; Christa N. Brunnschweiler and Edwin H. 
Bulte, “Fractionalization and the Fight over Natural Resources: Ethnicity, Language, Religion, and the 
Onset of Civil War,” OxCarre Research Paper no. 2009-17, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource 
Rich Economies, March 2009, 2. 
30 Andrew Beath, Fontini Christia, Ruben Enikolopov, “Winning Hearts and Minds through 
Development? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan,” Policy Research Working Paper 6129, 
The World Bank, July 2012, 5. 
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risk of war—although the causal mechanism still remains unclear—and the net effect of 
resources on conflict is ambiguous.31 In situations with increased ethnic divisions 
however, the pair found a corresponding increase in the chance for conflict when natural 
resources were present. The same did not hold true for religious or linguistic 
fractionalization. The positive correlation held only for above soil resources however, 
leading to the possibility that other factors such as land scarcity and tenuous property 
rights may be the driver for the increase in conflict, supporting a theory proposed by 
Catherine Andre and Jean-Philippe Platteau in 1998.32      
While much has been written on the systemic corruption and patronage networks 
within Afghanistan, and the MoM has taken strides to promote transparency, Professor 
Jonathan Goodhand presents counterview to the prevailing idea that corruption is 
inherently detrimental to state building. In his study, Goodhand examined the opium 
trade in Afghanistan and determined that collaborative relations between government 
officials and elite power holders in rural areas resulted in regions of relative stability, 
increased monetization, and marketization.33  In a state with weak central governance, 
peace building is likely to prevail when power and resource bargains are struck between 
rulers and elites in the periphery. Though corruption may produce inefficiencies, 
Goodhand points out that the dividends of peace may outweigh any costs of graft. 
Applied to the emerging natural resource sector, investors and donors may have to accept 
that priming the patronage pump may initially be a necessary evil to ensure political 
stability.            
                                                
31 Brunnschweiler and Bulte, “Fractionalization,” 1. 
32 Catherine Andre and Jean-Philippe Platteau, “Land Relations Under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda 
Caught in a Malthusian Trap,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 34, no. 1, (1998): 1-47, 
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33 Jonathon Goodhand, “Corrupting or Consolidating Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict 
Peacebuilding in Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 3 (May 21, 2008), 406, doi: 
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III. THE EFFECTS OF CULTURE AND RELIGION ON 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the ethnic, cultural, religious, and 
political dynamics within Afghan society. The importance of this discourse lies in the 
concept that culture often stands in the way of institutional reforms, and institutions 
matter for economic growth. While the goal is to describe the contemporary state of 
affairs in the country, historical context is provided to explain the origins of cultural 
norms and customs currently affecting societal and economic institutions today. The 
opening of the natural resource industry affects the full range of Afghan society, from the 
leaders in Kabul who handle contracting and resource rents, to rural villagers who may 
live in the vicinity of a larger scale mining operation, or who may partake in smaller scale 
extraction. The potential for wide spectrum of operations, from mega-resource tenders to 
smaller wildcat outfits, makes the cultural and political backdrop of Afghanistan a key 
element in analyzing the working relationships between leaders, citizens, and outside 
entities.    
In particular this chapter focuses on the distinct rural-urban split in Afghan 
society. Much of Afghanistan’s population resides at the village level where tribal 
customs and norms maintain order and trump institutionalized rule, yet the viability of 
these tribal codes are often overlooked by outsiders accustomed to more conventional 
forms of governance. Rule in Afghanistan occurs on many levels. The political landscape 
of the country can be viewed as a series of concentric rings of authority beginning with 
the village and radiating out to the district, provincial, and finally the national level.34  
The disjointed nature of the relationship between central rulers in Kabul and 
citizens in the periphery has fostered a culture of autonomy amongst rural Afghans. Weak 
central governments have traditionally relied on local powerbrokers to stem the gap and 
maintain stability in regions beyond the administration’s capacity to govern. These 
                                                
34 M. Jamil Hanifi, quoted in Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign until the Burst of 
Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier,” International Security 32, no. 4, Spring 2008, 51. 
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arrangements trade the benefits of stability for the drawbacks associated with corruption 
and patronage. The maintenance of client networks however, weakens economic potential 
within Afghanistan as national resources are siphoned off to buy the support of local 
elites.      
B. ETHNIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
The body of Afghanistan’s societal makeup is comprised of four distinct ethnic 
groups. Primarily inhabiting the central and southern portions of the country, Pashtuns 
have been the most dominant group since 1747 when they were brought together under 
Ahmed Shah Durrani in a confederacy that would later form the modern day nation of 
Afghanistan. Pashtuns currently represent 42% of the total population. Despite 
representing less than half of the population, the Pashtun plurality dominates Afghan 
culture. Leaders of the country have all been ethnic Pashtun, and the group’s tribal code 
of conduct constitutes a parallel form of governance that is the prevailing law of the land 
outside of urban centers. Traditionally the terms Pashtun and Afghan were 
interchangeable but have since diffused into separate descriptive spheres as inhabitants 
have flowed into the region. Tajiks, predominantly occupying the northern reaches of 
Afghanistan, are the second most populous group comprising 27% of the population. 
Hazaras and Uzbeks, prevailing from central and northwestern Afghanistan, respectively, 
each represent 9% of the total population.35  
The CIA World Fact Book estimates Afghanistan’s population at just over 31 
million as of 2013. While Kabul has seen a rapid rise in population with the onset of the 
Taliban insurgency, some 80% of Afghans still reside in small villages where subsistence 
farming and pastoralism allows a largely autonomous existence independent of urban city 
centers.36 This dichotomy of Afghan society, which leans heavily toward the rural and 
semi-autonomous, fosters a society where traditional norms and customs remain deeply 
engrained and local governance reigns supreme throughout the countryside. Accordingly, 
                                                
35 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “The World Factbook – Afghanistan,” August 22, 2013, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html; Barfield, Afghanistan, 19. 
36 Barfield, Afghanistan, 32. 
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the rural portions of Afghanistan have been described by many experts as an interwoven 
web of ethnic, tribal, and local characteristics which, depending on region and particular 
situation, take on varying roles in the makeup of one’s identity.37 
C. INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNANCE AND TRADE 
A common falsehood attributed to the exterior regions of Afghanistan is the 
notion that they are ungoverned spaces.38 The fact that many of these spaces lie outside 
the reach of the central government’s administrative capacity reinforces the impression of 
lawlessness to many outsiders. The reality is quite opposite however, as the tribal lands 
have been autonomously governed for a millennia by traditional codes of conduct, chiefly 
Pashtunwali (the way of the Pashtun). This honor-based tribal code, which incorporates 
such basic tenets as hospitality, justice, retribution, forgiveness, and independence, serves 
as an all-encompassing institution guiding both formal and informal interactions within 
Pashtun society.39 Abiding by the code is compulsory—doing so certifies one’s honor. 
Pashtunwali code has endured numerous central government collapses and has proved 
instrumental in maintaining clan harmony in the face of state failure.40 During times of 
war, the integrity of the cohesive tribal system has historically gained strength on every 
level thereby serving as the sole mechanism by which many Afghans retain social order 
in an otherwise chaotic environment.41  
The robustness of tribal codes has bestowed rural villages with the organic means 
to administer governance and dispute resolution at the local level. The inner workings of 
tribal dynamics are described by Afghan scholars in terms of a “triangle of power,” a 
trifecta of village leadership positions composed of village elders, mullahs, and 
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government officials.42 When in equilibrium, village elders represent the most dominant 
leg of the triangle, mullahs the second but much smaller side, and government officials an 
even smaller segment. Credible estimates show that some 95% of clan disputes are 
resolved by this council of trusted village members through the Jirga process—an 
assembly that relies on consultation and consensus to draw judgment. Tribal Mullahs 
play a small but important role in the process by ensuring decisions are in accordance 
with religious principles. Because of the perceived fairness, egalitarian nature, and 
religious endorsement, judgments arising from Jirgas are widely accepted throughout the 
village.43 
Tribal law, being based on restorative rather than punitive justice however, makes 
for an inherently precarious peace. Tribal disputes are settled in an eye-for-an-eye 
manner with the aim of restoring harmony amongst tribesmen and surrounding 
neighbors.44 Despite its utility, tribal justice occasionally results in blood feuds that can 
last generations. This type of conflict, which turns members of society inward and 
xenophobic, hinders opportunity for broader trade and development within the state.  
Further, in a clan type society such as rural Afghanistan’s, reputation and honor 
bound trade practices, while legal contracts are largely foreign and bare little merit. 
Business agreements and relationships are forged personally and over long periods of 
time. Conversely, in the international world of business, non-personnel trade, contracts, 
and legal documents supplant reputation and honor. While face-to-face business dealings 
can thrive on the micro level, this rural form of transaction makes it harder for a society 
to transition to more complex forms of industrialization, which require risks and capital 
mobilization beyond the capacity of informal institutions of trade.45       
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D. ROLE OF ISLAM IN AFGHAN SOCIETY 
Afghanistan is a thoroughly Muslim nation on several levels. Centuries of Islamic 
influence from neighboring Arab dynasties has had a great effect on the religious identity 
of the country, transforming the nation from a Buddhist and Zoroastrian past to one 
where nearly the entire population currently distinguishes itself as Muslim.46 The Sunni 
sect of Islam accounts for 85% of the country’s Muslim inhabitants while the remaining 
15% are Shia and belong mainly to the Hazara and other ethnic groups.47 Beyond the 
sheer plurality of the religion, Afghanistan is described by experts as possessing an older 
type of Islamic society where the religion transcends mere ideology and becomes an all-
encompassing way of life.48 In this sense, all interactions—be it business dealings, moral 
dilemmas, or dispute resolutions—are tempered with Islamic doctrine and jurisprudence.  
Few nations can claim a level of homogeneity equal to that exhibited by Afghan 
Muslims. While the myriads of tribes within the country remain segmented and distinct, 
Islam has been used as a tool in the past by various actors to rally the population against 
both foreign intrusions, as was the case in the Anglo-Afghan wars, and against the state 
itself, as was the case with the progressive measures of King Amanullah.49 Indeed, the 
prevailing national sentiment holds that Afghans are the strongest, most pure believers in 
Islam, and therefore cede to no one on the grounds of their interpretation of the religion.50 
Afghans are Muslim by birth—little else is necessary to maintain that status apart from 
abiding by tribal norms and mores. Forging a life as an honorable Afghan in effect, 
makes one a good Muslim in the eyes of society. Because of the integral role Islam plays 
in the day-to-day dealings amongst Afghans, interactions with so-called nonbelievers are 
generally conducted with suspicion.51 
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The grafting of Islam with traditional Afghan tribal codes has not been a seamless 
process. The melding of the two often results in contradictory judgments and moral 
incoherence.52 Tribal codes such as those that prescribe honor-based restitution and 
revenge-motivated actions are out of step with the widely accepted forms of Islamic 
teachings and Sharia jurisprudence. A key factor that facilitates the ability for Afghans to 
layer Islam over deep seeded tribal mores lies simply in the fact that the majority 
possesses a weak conceptual understanding of the religion and its core tenets.53 For 
instance, under Taliban rule, commerce, education, and public welfare—all tenets 
traditionally valued by Muslim societies—were obviated under Taliban rule, despite the 
group’s self proclaimed image as practitioners of the Islamic faith.54 Further, theological 
debate is not an aspect of the rural style Islam practiced in Afghanistan. This 
unquestioning nature—or blind loyalty to one’s religion, coupled with a poor 
understanding of the faith, has created a historical susceptibility to manipulation from 
perceived religious authorities. 
The inculcation of Islam in Afghanistan has occurred lockstep with colonial 
forays and interventions in the country. The rise of the religion owes much to the fact that 
it was often used as an opportunistic tool in rousing disparate tribal groups against 
invading powers. Early examples of the exploitability of Afghan piety date back to the 
Afghan-Anglo wars in the late 19th century where accounts of charismatic Mullahs used 
religious narratives to incite uprisings against British soldiers. A clear early example of 
this occurred in 1897 when a local religious figure from the Swat valley named Mullah 
Saidullah began to spread foreboding rumors of an impending holy war between Afghans 
and Colonial powers. Saidullah’s sermons were peppered with tales of fantastical powers, 
and “heavenly hosts” that would accompany he and his followers into battle with their 
foreign occupiers.55 
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Mullah Saidullah’s mix of charisma and mysticism found great appeal amongst 
the tribes of rural Afghanistan. His demagogic antics were essential to his ability to 
quickly mobilize local villagers in raids against the British garrisons at Chakdara and 
Malakand.56 British soldiers were justly taken aback by the 5,000-strong militia that 
turned out against their fortifications—noting the swift and fanatic nature of the raid—
many were left to question previous assumption that tribesmen lacked the requisite 
organization to conduct coordinated attacks.57 Winston Churchill, a soldier and war 
reporter in Malakand during the time, ascribed several factors for the successes of the 
Mullahs in the region. First, the penchant for rural Afghans to take rumors at face value 
frequently turned gossip and hearsay into accepted truth. Second, villagers tended to latch 
on to charismatic leaders and their promises, following them despite anecdotal evidence 
to the contrary.58 
Contemporary tribal culture in rural Afghanistan still exhibits an inclination for 
the fantastic machinations and the captivating power of charismatic leaders that Churchill 
described a century ago. Mullah Saidullah, later branded “Mad Fakir,” became one of 
many clerics associated with “Mad Mullah” insurrections that continue today.59 Mullah 
Omar, spiritual leader of the Taliban, is a modern example of the enduring pertinence of 
these two forces amongst Pashtun society. Omar’s rise to “Commander of the Faithful,” 
and former de facto leader of Afghanistan, was surrounded by legendary tales of his 
prowess as a Mujahedeen soldier and his self-reported visions as Afghanistan’s savior. In 
1996 Omar solidified his mythical status when he donned a cloak purported to belong to 
the prophet Mohammad and scaled a hillside for his followers to see.60 While short of the 
outlandish claims and theatrical showmanship of Mullah Saidullah a century ago, Omar’s 
otherworldly persona and fiery rhetoric against outsiders evoked a primal resonance in 
many disaffected Pashtun villagers. 
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E. A PRECAUTIONARY TALE FROM PAKISTAN 
In principle, Islam is completely compatible with responsible corporate business 
practices.61 In reality, the conservative form of Islam practiced amongst Pashtuns, 
coupled with the long history of foreign intervention in South Asia, has forged negative 
attitudes toward western business endeavors in the region. Foreign ventures risk many 
stigmas—from being purveyors of un-Islamic vices, to occupiers of Muslim lands, to 
neo-colonialists with monopolistic agendas. The tale of the Reko Diq copper-gold project 
in Pakistan’s Baluchistan region provides a vivid example of the negative impacts of 
xenophobic and ethnically fractured societies on business opportunities. 
Reko Diq is an untapped copper and gold deposit located in the remote region of 
Baluchistan boasting an estimated $60 billion worth of extractable material. The Tethyan 
Copper Company (TCC), a joint Canadian-Chilean venture, possessed the exploration 
rights to the area, and since 2006 the company has expended $220 million in exploration 
and feasibility studies. The company planned to invest a total of $3.3 billion in 
infrastructure at the site, including a processing facility, a power plant, and an 
underground pipeline to the Arabian port of Gwadar. The mine was to employ 11,000. In 
addition to royalties and taxes, the government of Baluchistan had a handsome 25% stake 
in the operation. All told, Pakistan stood to share half of the operation’s estimated $60 
billion yield—for no money down.62 
In 2011, the Baluchistan provincial government abruptly denied TCC a license to 
mine Reko Diq. While TCC did not get and official explanation, Reuters news agency 
quoted a local government official stating that TCC was “cheating” Baluchistan. “They 
are a monopoly . . . they don’t want to disclose the worth of the gold in Baluchistan.”63  
Shortly after TCC was denied its exploitation license, the government of Baluchistan 
granted 11 exploration permits to 5 inexperienced Pakistani and Chinese mining outfits. 
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Subsequent negotiations between TCC and the Baluchi Government failed, and in 2013 
the company pursued monetary damages for prior investments and lost profits through 
the international court of arbitrations. TCC Chief Executive stated of the situation, 
“Recent developments have regrettably compelled Tethyan to withdraw the request for 
specific performance . . . while we have long hoped to mine Reko Dik, as is Tethyan’s 
right, the conduct of Pakistan and Baluchistan has made that goal impractical.”64  
 Mining in rural portions of Afghanistan is acutely dependent on a social license 
to operate. Before smooth extraction operations can occur, locals must be fully accepting 
of a foreign footprint on their land. The strong xenophobic streak amongst many Afghans 
will pose a challenge in peripheral areas of the country. Ethnic fragmentation and dearth 
property rights issues will have to be assuaged in order to avoid Reko Diq type follies 
from occurring in Afghanistan.              
F. ENDURING REGIONS 
Afghanistan’s history as a buffer state has produced a nation whose present 
borders are not drawn according to distinct geographical or ethnic lines, but were created 
as a result of encroaching imperial powers.65 The major ethnicities within Afghanistan—
Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Uzbeks—are therefore split amongst the neighboring countries of 
Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan respectively.  The shared cultural, social, and ethnic 
ties amongst Afghanistan and the surrounding Asian States create a natural environment 
for regional trade networks. Lack of state capacity and harmonized trade agreements 
however, has suppressed formal trade and resulted illicit exchange networks including the 
smuggling of natural resources out of Afghanistan.66  
Afghanistan is best described an amalgamation of the four distinct regional 
components. These regions, most commonly identified by their historical urban centers—
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Kandahar, Kabul, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif, have each retained their cultural ubiquity 
despite political, religious, and other outside influence.67 Herat, which lies in the western 
portion of the country, has long been culturally and politically tied to Iran. Because of its 
location along the ancient Silk Road, Herat served as a strategic junction point for goods 
transiting between China and Persia. Herat is best recognized as the cultural capital for 
arts and literature in Afghanistan and for the historically high production potential of its 
citizens.68 Kandahar in the south lies in the center of the Pashtun belt and was the site of 
the original capital of Afghanistan prior to its transfer to Kabul in 1776. While the 
Registan Desert dominates the topography, the region is fed by the Helmand River, 
which provides irrigated plains for agriculture. The region plays host to the nation’s 
robust poppy production. Mazar-I-Sharif is the site of the nation’s most significant shrine, 
which draws many pilgrims each year. The region’s northern disposition places it on top 
of the massive petroleum fields that dominate Central Asia. Kabul holds the nation’s 
capital and the central eastern position in the country. The region traditionally supports 
the highest population with some 30% of the nation’s citizens residing within the area. 
Kabul serves as the gateway to the strategic Khyber Pass that links Afghanistan to 
Pakistan through the Hindu Kush range. 
Throughout history these four key regions have operated variously as independent 
kingdoms, under the rule of assorted empires, or were autonomously governed at the 
local level and paid homage to a central power.69 The enduring individual identity of 
Afghanistan’s regional components produces a state that is better described as an empire 
vice a nation. This creates a condition where state autonomy is precariously dependent on 
client-patron relationships. The emergence of mineral wealth complicates these 
relationships, as Kabul must ensure that it distributes resource rents to local leaders 
 within shared jurisdictions. In short, when neither the state nor local leaders possess the 
sole extraction authority, a situation arises where predation and rent-seeking occurs on 
both the local and national levels.          
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G. POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, DECENTRALIZATION, AND REGIONAL 
AUTONOMY  
Political legitimacy in Afghanistan has historically flowed from dynastic 
(monarchy or patrilineal) and religious means. The archetypal leader in Afghanistan is 
one who unquestionably possesses either or both of these virtues.70 Effective past leaders 
such as Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747–1772), Dost Muhammad (1826–39; 45–63), Abdur 
Rahman (1880–1901), and Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929–33), were those who in 
addition to holding regal lineage were further perceived as exemplifying military acumen 
and dominant personas. These traditionally successful rulers earned their stature through 
their ability to fend off rivals and maintain tribal harmony.71 In short, beyond heritage, 
stature in Afghan society remains very much merit based. The same sets of qualities 
attributed to these former rulers are also commonly possessed by local powerbrokers, or 
“strongmen,” scattered throughout peripheral regions in Afghanistan.72 
Contentious past relationships between the central state and the semi-autonomous 
marginal regions of Afghanistan have unfortunately led to a widely accepted belief that 
the country is ungovernable. Counter to conventional wisdom, much of the population in 
Afghanistan has historically accepted state rule—but not in the modern democratic sense 
Western countries are accustom to. The successful leaders mentioned above were keenly 
aware of both the limits and reach of their authority, and of the Pashtun affinity for 
independence. These leaders proclaimed their rule in theory, but realized enforcing such a 
notion was both impractical and undesirable. The majority of the Afghan population for 
their part have historically accepted state rule as long as it was brokered through local 
trusted agents and remained ostensibly unobtrusive.73 This bestows local leaders with 
powerful hedges to state authority and makes their role key for implementing national 
economic policies.   
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The symbiotic relationship of semi-autonomy-for-allegiance that has been forged 
between the peripheral population and the leadership in Kabul has led to a decentralized 
form of state rule where local governance and regional strongmen play a key role in 
maintaining harmony and order. A recurring theme in Afghan history is the rejection of 
wholesale change, especially amongst the rural regions. King Amanullah’s social 
initiatives in the 1920s, the Marxist doctrine of the Peoples Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA), and the extreme form of Islam enforced by the Taliban all resulted 
in rejection and overthrow. The rule by proxy relationship between the center and the 
exterior has naturally lent itself to the establishment of a robust patronage network 
amongst elite local actors and state authorities. The maintenance of such a network 
negatively effects economic growth as elites become focused on channeling revenues 
toward further consolidating their power vice funding productive development projects.74 
H. CENTER-PERIPHERAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Contemporary Afghanistan can aptly be categorized as a patrimonial state.75 
While thirty years of war and political upheaval has seen new actors entering the scene at 
both the local and state level—a dynamic which has destroyed many of the long 
established center-periphery relationships—the culture of patronage still runs deep in 
Afghan society. Prior to formation of the current state-run institutions, client-patron 
relationships formed the bedrock of the nation’s political economy and, despite 
centralization efforts since, a clear distinction between formal and informal, and state and 
non-state dimensions of politics and business still does not exist.  
Since the early consolidation of the nation’s various territories into a state, local 
power brokers have played an integral part in a complex network of relationships with the 
central capital. Patronage networks in Afghanistan traditionally are established around 
various formal and informal arrangements such as appointments, marriage, gift giving, 
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favors, or protection. Generally the establishment of these connections was an imperative 
for rulers. While the degree of power conferred from the center has waxed and waned 
through successive leaders, cresting with the rule of the Abdur “Iron Emir” Rahman at 
the turn of the 19th century, Afghanistan has historically been a unitary state under 
monarch rule. The nature of state administration under the king, at least prior to the 
PDPA coup in 1978, was aimed at maintaining order, not permeating local politics.76 
Successful leaders imposed change in the urban areas and allowed their writ to slowly 
emanate to the periphery. In this respect the state heavily relied on the ability of its local 
elites and strong men to mete out changes and keep peace in the hinterlands. In exchange 
for maintaining order, local leaders were given leeway to impress political and economic 
agendas as they saw fit as long as their actions did not pose a threat to the central state 
powers.  
Since 2001, foreign interventionists in Afghanistan have pushed ideas of state 
building that aim to marginalize or eliminate the country’s customary client-patron 
network. Indeed, viewed through a western lens, the stature and dealings of local elites, 
warlords, and powerbrokers are seen in a distasteful light by many. Those in developed 
nations accurately categorize these relationships and practices as constituting any number 
of forms of corruption, crony capitalism, or nepotism. Further, decentralized patron-client 
forms of administration, it is held, tends to portray a maligned view of the central 
government in the eyes of the rural citizens since the state’s capacity to deliver services is 
seldom apparent. This dynamic is seen in the fact that some 78% of rural Afghan 
villagers trust their local leaders, but rulers in Kabul are largely viewed with contempt.77  
Despite the inefficiencies of corruption and the poor relationships forged between 
rural citizens and state leaders as a result of rule by proxy, stable periods in modern 
Afghan history have taken place coincidentally with the existence of healthy center-
periphery relationships. Conversely, those times following regime change, such as the 
periods after the overthrow of King Amanullah in 1929, and the coup that unseated King 
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Zahir Shah in 1973, have been accompanied by phases of civil unrest associated with the 
severing of ties between central rulers and regional strongmen. The Afghan civil war 
spanning 1992–1996 is a bitter example of the type of power vacuum that is created post 
regime upheaval in Kabul. Absent a central figurehead with strong ties to the periphery, 
civil unrest descended upon the nation as the influence of regional warlords remained 
unchecked. 
The cornerstone of the most recent state building expedition, the Bonn Agreement 
of 2001, sought to establish an interim administration until such time “a fully 
representative government can be elected through free and fair elections.”78 With the 
agreement, the drafters both effectively eliminated the role of a monarch in Afghan 
politics and imposed a deadline for elections despite the fact that the country had never 
conducted such a process. The provisions of Bonn served to damage the legitimacy of the 
current president, Hamid Karzai, in several ways. First, the presidential elections robbed 
the leader of the traditional Afghan path to ascendancy. The fact that they were 
surrounded by accusations of corruption only made matters worse. Second, the time-
honored Afghan maxim that leaders must be free of foreign influence (even if they are 
receiving aid) has been lost on the current leader. 
Despite the aims of Bonn the importance of strong center-periphery relationships 
persist. Afghanistan’s s Independent Directorate of Governance Control (IDLG) is a 
presidential body that seeks to reestablish central control at the subnational level by 
appointing officials at the provincial and district levels who have ties to Kabul. The 
program is not without its drawbacks and detractors, while the agents selected may have 
close ties to Kabul, they are often outsiders to the community they are appointed to 
oversee. Further, community-building programs such as the National Solidarity Program 
(NSP), which seeks to empower villages through bottom up-development projects and 
local good governance, run counter to the imposition of top-down governance.79 The 
existence of these two competing programs speaks to the current unsettled state of the 
rural-urban split within Afghanistan.  
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I. CONCLUSION 
Afghanistan remains an ethnically, geographically, and politically fractured 
nation. The absence of broad colonization or strong central rule in the country’s history 
has produced a state where distinct regions dominate, and governance has evolved 
through decentralized channels. Regional powerbrokers are vital entities in reconciling 
the multitudes of diverse tribes and villages with the central authority in Kabul. The 
challenge for the Ministry of Mines is the crafting of an industry of extraction that passes 
the social license to operate within the far reaches of Afghan society yet retains the level 
of transparency required by international actors. Foreign investors on the other hand 
should realize that, at least in the near term, the dividends of social and political stability 
might outweigh the inefficiencies associated with a well-primed patronage network. 
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IV. EFFECTS OF AID DEPENDENCE AND RESOURCE 
REVENUE ON GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS  
“The natural resource sector has the ability to make up 40% of Afghanistan’s GDP.”  
—Whadullah Sharrani, Afghan Minister of Mines, 2012 
A. INTRODUCTION 
By the close of the military mission in 2014, the United States will have spent 
$100 billion in an effort to reconstruct Afghanistan.80 This chapter examines the effect 
that these reconstruction funds have had on government institutions and economic 
progress in Afghanistan in an attempt to better understand the potential impact of 
resource revenue from the country’s emerging mining industry. Foreign aid and resource 
revenue bear characteristics to similar “windfall gains” where recipient countries are 
essentially dealt a free stream of income.81 These alternate sources of state revenue have 
varying, but analogous, effects on political and economic institutions, thus examining the 
past effects of one can serve as a close approximation of the future effects of another.    
The manner and magnitude in which aid and resource revenues are dispensed and 
collected within a country produce different effects on host nation governance and 
economic growth. For instance aid programs that are pinpointed in their aim and 
conditionally implemented tend to have a more positive effect than those without 
oversight or strings attached.82 Similarly, resource revenue derived from subsoil, labor-
intense operations, seems to cause less conflict within society than operations associated 
with lucrative, easily extracted minerals—so-called “lootable” resources, which tend to 
prolong existing conflicts.83 The degree to which governments are able to handle the 
economic shocks associated with ambitious aid programs and resource booms plays a 
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large role in determining whether rents are cycled toward productive means or captured 
by rent-seeking individuals and siphoned out of the local economy. The following 
analysis attempts to account for the numerous variables associated with windfall gains by 
using existing literature and cross-national regression analysis of other rent dependent 
nations in an effort to draw parallels and conclusions from Afghanistan’s current political 
and economic standing. 
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN AID      
There are dense amounts of literature describing the effects of aid on government 
institutions, level of corruption, and the economic growth of recipient countries. On the 
most general level, two schools of thought exist concerning the utility of aid programs in 
developing countries—simply that aid either has a positive or negative affect on 
corruption, quality of governance, and long-term economic growth. Closer examination 
of studies from the field reveals that there are numerous variables that need to be 
accounted for when evaluating a particular country’s situation. What was the level of 
corruption before the influx of aid? Were conditional measures placed on the aid and aid 
programs? What was the preexisting level of political stability? What is the level of 
human capital? How much aid is devoted to investment? What was the magnitude of the 
aid package—carefully metered or a massive windfall? What is clear from the literature 
is that every aid dependent country has its own unique set of factors and variables to the 
extent that, while generalizations can be made as to the overall effectiveness of aid, each 
case must be evaluated on its own merit in order to draw the most accurate conclusion as 
to the effectiveness of aid within a particular nation. 
While there is no consensus on the long-term benefit of aid, recent studies have 
introduced and highlighted particular dynamics that are associated with the application of 
aid. Celebrated work by Craig Burnside and David Dollar in 2000 found that aid only 
stimulated economic growth in countries possessing sound macroeconomic policies.84 
Paolo Mauro’s analysis of corruption and growth confirmed that corruption hinders 
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economic progress, while Alberto Alesina and Beatrice Weder made the interesting 
discovery that countries with higher levels of corruption actually garner higher amounts 
of aid, thus creating an ambiguous causal link between corruption and aid.85 Carl-Johan 
Dalgaard and Ola Olsson established an association between levels of economic aid and 
growth, where moderate aid inflows show a positive effect, while larger sums are less 
effective and even detrimental to economic growth.86 Henrik Hansen and Finn Tarp 
further this logic by suggesting a “diminishing marginal returns” hypothesis where there 
exists a break point in the amount of aid a particular society can manage.87 When the 
amount of aid exceeds a given level, rent-seeking behavior will predominate over 
productive endeavors and entrepreneurism. Finally, Kevin Murphy, et al. show in their 
work “Why is Rent-Seeking so Costly to Growth,” that in countries where individuals are 
oriented toward rent-seeking, slower economic growth follows.88    
 \Afghanistan’s reaction to aid presents a complex case study as the country is 
strongly affected by endogenous factors such as inhospitable geography, cultural habits, 
and political instability as well as exogenous factors in the form of intense foreign 
machinations and strategic interests. Fortunately Afghanistan’s long record of aid 
dependence dating back to the initial British influence in 1830s provides ample 
opportunity by which to study the effects of aid over various periods in the nation’s 
history. Since the so called “Great Game,” the competition of expanding empires between 
Czarist Russia from the North down, and British India from the south up, Afghanistan’s 
geostrategic position has resulted in a nation that has been subject to external aid since 
early in its statehood. This pattern of external influence was repeated during the Soviet 
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occupation from 1979–89, and most recently with the U.S. and coalition effort beginning 
in 2001 to present.  
C. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN AFGHANISTAN 
Afghanistan remains an aid dependent country today. Since 2001 the United 
States alone has apportioned $89 billion in reconstruction aid.89 Total military and 
foreign aid for 2011–2012 dispersed to Afghanistan amounted to $15.7 billion—a figure 
equaling to the nation’s GDP.90 The following section argues that this massive sum was 
simply beyond the absorptive capacity of Afghanistan’s fledgling economy and has 
therefore led to profuse rent-seeking behavior amongst elites and powerbrokers within 
society. This in turn has perpetuated corruption throughout the state, which has stymied 
economic growth and fostered instability as the majority of the population is subject to 
elitist rule and exclusive economic opportunity. The dynamic of emergent patterns of 
corruption and the associated adverse economic effects are covered more thoroughly in 
Chapter V.      
The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) produces 
a detailed report to the United States Congress every quarter documenting inefficiencies 
and misappropriation of aid funds. While the aim of the Special Inspector General is to 
curb corruption and strengthen the conditionality placed on aid, the sheer scale of the 
discrepancies found—U.S. $4.5 billion worth of abuses in the January 2013 report 
alone—seems to suggest that the magnitude of aid overwhelms the country’s ability to 
resist corruption and rent-seeking behavior despite international oversight.91 Further, 
much of the aid has been focused on top-down programs and initiatives ill aimed at 
spurring productivity and stemming corruption. One particularly poignant example found 
in the SIGAR report details the audit of two Afghan National Boarder Police facilities 
located in Kunduz and Nangarhar provinces. The facilities were constructed at a cost of 
U.S. $27 million, but upon follow up inspection it was found that the facilities were either 
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empty or used for unintended purposes, including one that functioned as a large chicken 
coop.92 
Governance and economic indicators remain low in Afghanistan. The 
Bertelsmann-Stiftung Transformative Index, which evaluates the quality of democracy, 
market economy, and political management, ranks Afghanistan 124th out of 128 
transforming countries.93 In Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, a 
surrogate measure of governance quality, Afghanistan shares the bottom of the list with 
North Korea and Somalia for highest degree of corruption.94 Since 2005 Afghanistan has 
shown a negative trend on the corruption index despite an increasing trend in aid for 
governance and development (increasing from $195 million in FY 2002 to $4.5 billion 
for FY 2010).95  
Using data introduced above, several inferences can be made concerning the 
association between corruption and aid in Afghanistan. First, the volume of aid has 
exceeded the “diminishing marginal returns” point and is driving rent-seeking behavior 
and corruption amongst elites. Second, the rising levels of corruption are negatively 
impacting economic growth. A further empirical observation that can be derived from the 
past decade of foreign aid lies in the dynamic that, while per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) has risen steadily, from $198 in 2003 to $619 in 2011, much of this 
growth is attributed to revenue associated with the foreign military mission.96 The 
services industry, which captures much of the foreign expenditures, accounts for 
Afghanistan’s largest portion of GDP at 54%. While the value added as percent of GDP 
has steadily risen in the services sector, the corresponding measure in the industrial sector 
has fallen from its highpoint in 2006, and exports as a percent of GDP have steadily 
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declined over the same period.97 This data indicates that the Afghan economy has grown 
dependent on foreign expenditures and that the draw-down of the military mission in 
2014 will have a significant negative impact on the services sector (and therefore per 
capita GDP of the country as a whole) as the “temporary resource boom” established by 
the sizeable military footprint wanes. 
Following Burnside and Dollar’s postulate that aid only stimulates growth in 
countries possessing sound macroeconomic policies (e.g., low inflation and balanced 
budgets), Afghanistan’s 10% inflation rate in 2012, rising corruption, and falling export 
sector suggests fiscal policies are inadequate and misguided. Further evidence of poor 
fiscal policy lies in the fact that despite the impressive increase in per capita GDP since 
2003, the county’s poverty level has been stuck at 36% since 2008.98 This data taken as a 
whole suggests that leaders will need to make significant adjustments to fiscal and 
monetary policies before the natural resources sector can positively affect economic 
growth and development.   
D. UPSIDE POTENTIAL OF NATURAL RESOURCE REVENUE 
While the historical effects of aid have shown useful in identifying shortfalls in 
Afghanistan’s economic policy (and can serve as a proximate measure to forecast the 
potential affect natural resource revenue will exert on government institutions and 
economic growth) there remain important distinctions between aid and resource revenue 
that merit explanation. A particularly critical difference is that resource revenues, unlike 
aid, have a tangible basis—the resources themselves. Resource rich states enjoy a 
comparative advantage in a particular sector and thus the potential for industrialization 
and development based on organic means.    
World Bank analysts Gary McMahon and Brandon Tracy identify three avenues 
for development that natural resources bring: industrialization, infrastructure, and fiscal 
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revenues.99 Industrialization potential includes both the extractive sector itself and 
businesses that provide support and services to the sector such as mining supply 
companies and transportation services. Infrastructure development includes transportation 
advances such as highway and rail systems, power generation and distribution grids, and 
other tertiary developments such as piped water and telecommunications networks. Fiscal 
revenues result from the mines themselves in the form of royalty payments, taxes, and 
tendering fees, in addition to taxes derived from support industries. While aid can 
certainly finance industries, build infrastructure, and directly increase fiscal revenues, a 
further upshot that resource-based revenues enjoy over aid are the “spillover effects” 
associated with developing an economy grounded in a tangible good.  
The idea of the spillover effect comes from leveraging an industry, in 
Afghanistan’s case large-scale extraction operations, to form “resource corridors” 
comprised of smaller scale support businesses that provide goods and services to the 
extraction process. The scale of the businesses opportunities induced by large-scale 
mining operations can be quite broad—ranging from street vendors, to gear suppliers, to 
maintenance of railway and transportation equipment and beyond.100 The goal behind a 
resource corridor is to economically diversify specific areas by rendering local 
individuals capable of providing inputs to industry. The key to the creation of a resource 
corridor is to enable the establishment of spinoff businesses that both add value to the 
economy, by locally processing and transforming raw materials into intermediate and 
finished products, as well as capturing and reinvesting incomes earned.101  
The number of indirect jobs created around an extraction operation often 
outnumbers the total employment generated directly by the mine itself.102 Recent studies 
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estimate indirect job creation ranging from 2–8 times that of the primary mine.103 The 
buildup of a service and support industry around a primary mining site drives a dynamic 
form of growth often referred to as the “multiplier effect,” where the injection of revenue 
leads to additional local spending, which in turn leads to additional income for spinoff 
and support business in the region, and so on. Analysis of the Argentinian mining sector 
shows that for the 87,000 directly employed by the mines throughout the country, 
316,000 indirect jobs were created, a four-fold effect The Yanacocha mine in Peru 
showed a 14-fold effect.104  
E. GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN AVOIDING THE PITFALLS OF 
RESOURCE REVENUE 
The successful multiplier effect exhibited in Peru’s Yanacocha mine requires 
careful government planning and sequencing to establish resource corridors and to 
prepare citizens to capitalize on business opportunities. An array of initiatives are 
available to host governments that can ignite economic development in resource rich 
areas—from requiring domestic procurement of equipment, to organic skills formation, to 
piggybacking off of infrastructure enhancements. The Economic Recovery Program 
(ERP) initiated by resource rich Ghana is one example of a government-implemented 
plan to multiply mining revenue and increase domestic value added. In the early 1980s 
Ghanaian leadership established training programs to fill positions that would otherwise 
go to expatriates and passed a minerals mining act that, which amongst other protections, 
required companies to domestically procure 60% of their purchases by year 4 of 
operation. Under this legislation Ghana saw their mining sector grow, from comprising 
1% of GDP in the 1980s to 6% GDP by 2008. Share of mining exports increased from 
20% to 45% over the same period, and foreign direct investment in the sector amounted 
to nearly U.S. $8 billion from 1994 to 2010.105 
In addition to the multiplier income resource corridors create, other long term 
benefits of industrial buildup around mineral sectors include the potential for 
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diversification of manufacturing within the region, a dynamic which has been reasoned 
by Sachs and Warner to increase the long term overall standard of living for society as a 
whole. This form of economic diversification that capitalizes on side stream linkages 
developed by spinoff industries is an important factor in reducing a nation’s dependence 
on primary exports, thus lessening the likelihood of that country suffering from “Dutch 
Disease,” where resource rents crowed out manufacturing.106 
Reforms and intervention programs unfortunately do not happen by accident; 
rather conscious and committed government efforts are required to enact change. In 
addition, empirical evidence suggests that leaders must be either incentivized or forced to 
enact policy reform. Economist Stephan Haggard argued, “International shocks and 
pressures, and the domestic economic crisis associated with them, have been the most 
powerful stimuli for changes in policy.”107 Indeed, the Ghanaian ERP reforms came on 
the heels of a deep financial crisis that resulted in a military coup in 1981. The leader of 
the coup, Jerry J. Rawlings, stated in an address to the nation, “The time has now come 
for us to restructure society in a real and meaningful democratic manner so as to ensure 
the involvement and active participation of the people in the decision making process.”108 
This change in leadership and thinking that followed were the catalysts for the Ghanaian 
government to pursue IMF intervention and structural adjustment, which eventually 
reversed of the nation’s precipitous economic decline.109  
Regardless of Mr. Rawling’s motivations, Ghana’s ERP program represented a 
shift away from policies that were geared toward serving an elite few, and toward the 
type of “inclusive” economic institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson argue are responsible 
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for creating virtuous cycles of development.110 Ghana’s move toward inclusiveness is 
evidenced by its investment in social welfare programs aimed at increasing the skill sets 
and opportunities amongst its general population. A 2013 study of select Sub-Saharan 
countries by the IMF showed a strong correlation between increased economic growth 
and counties that invested in social welfare programs.111 The study used public education 
and healthcare availability as proxy measures to track the level of government 
commitment toward its citizens, with the authors particularly focusing on opportunities 
afforded to the poorest in society. The logic behind the methodology being that a state 
that invests in its most vulnerable citizens is oriented toward inclusive institutions, and 
inclusive institutions lead to economic growth. The correlation held in the case of post-
coup Ghana. In the decades following Ghana’s structural adjustment, access to both 
primary school education and health care increased while the country enjoyed steady 
economic growth over the same period.112 While the country would remain under the 
“soft authoritarian” leadership of Mr. Rawlings for several years, the ‘81 coup was a shift 
toward political democratization and economic liberalization. Conversely, portions of the 
international aid to Afghanistan have been used to strengthen patronage networks and 
shield the leadership in Kabul from the types of international shocks and internal crisis 
described by Haggard.113 The current level of international security and financial support 
provided to Afghanistan has thus lessened the incentives for the nation’s leaders to 
implement reforms aimed at long-term economic growth. This presents obstacles for the 
realization of resource corridors based of a robust mining industry.                     
F. THE RENTIER STATE  
An unhealthy dependence on resource revenue has similar negative effects on 
economic growth as an over dependence on foreign aid. While keen government 
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intervention can steer a state toward diversification in manufacturing and connect its 
citizens to global markets, other endogenous factors peculiar to resource abundant nations 
play a significant role in determining whether a country falls prey to the so-called 
“resource curse.” Resource revenues, much like top down aid programs, affect 
government institutions in several ways. An emerging generation of scholarship 
examining the dynamics of the resource curse distinguishes three specific dimensions of 
the “rentier effect” associated with governments that are effectively dealt a free source of 
income through resource rents.114 115  
First, income streams from resource revenues supplant the need for governments 
to raise income from taxation. This facilitates a breakdown of the social contract between 
the state and its residents, as leaders are accountable to a lesser degree when not 
dependent on public taxation. Second, resource rents run the risk of falling prey to rent-
seeking elites in society who funnel the income toward strengthening patronage networks 
and other unproductive means in the effort to further entrench themselves atop society. 
Last, resource revenue can spur competition amongst factions in society over the control 
of the resources. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that nations endowed with easily 
extractable and transportable resources such as diamonds tend to suffer from conflict 
more often than states with resources requiring more effort to process.116 
Further research into the resource-conflict correlation from Brunnschweiler and 
Bulte finds that civil war creates a dependence on primary exports, but the reverse is not 
true. In a separate piece, Brunnschweiler showed that nations abundant in subsoil 
resources showed a positive association with economic growth over the period of 1970 – 
2000.117 When the study applied measures of institutional quality, using rule of law and 
government effectiveness as indicators, the data showed a positive correlation between 
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quality of governance and economic growth. The findings in these two studies confirm 
what empirical evidence has long suggested—that institutional quality is a primary 
determinant in whether states suffer from civil conflict, poor economic growth, and other 
ailments symptomatic of the resource curse. 
G. PORTENTS OF RESOURCE REVENUE ON AFGHAN GOVERNMENT 
INSTITUTIONS 
The Mes Aynak copper deposit and the Hajigak iron ore site in Logar and 
Bamyan provinces represent the two most promising tenders on Afghan soil. A recent 
quantitative analysis of these two sites places the direct annual impact to national income 
at U.S.$ 745 million, or 8.1% of 2008 GNI levels. When procurement of locally sourced 
inputs are factored in, the figure jumps to U.S.$ 1.04 billion, or 11.3% of 2008 GNI 
levels. The average annual exports for the two mines between 2016–40 are estimated to 
be U.S.$2.3 billion—a 4-fold increase in export of official goods and services over 2009 
figures. The two mines are also expected to directly employ 6,400 personnel with the 
potential to create several times that figure worth of positions in support and spinoff 
industries.118 While these figures are admittedly estimates, they are also conservative 
figures which, even in their lowball state clearly show that the mining sector in 
Afghanistan has a strong potential to drive sustained economic growth within the 
country.      
The preceding analysis of Afghanistan’s reaction to foreign aid suggests the 
nation’s governance and institutional quality is ill prepared to handle the potential 
resource revenue described above. The nature of the Mes Aynak and Hajigak deposits 
however, provide innate barriers to development, which may bar the government in its 
current form from exploiting these two sites. Because of the labor and capital-intensive 
nature of extracting copper and iron ore, both Mes Aynak and Hajigak have been 
tendered to large state owned enterprises (SOEs) from China and India respectively. 
Future mining operations will require additional large investments from these two SOEs 
to build the infrastructure and industrial capacity conspicuously lacking in the region. 
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This is unlikely to happen until governance, rule of law, and stability improves. 
Interestingly then, Afghanistan may well avoid the misfortunes associated with the 
resource curse simply because extraction will not happen on a large scale until quality 
institutions are in place.   
H. CONCLUSION  
Afghanistan has been subject to the influences of foreign aid since early in its 
statehood. Much of the aid has been provided by foreign powers more interested in 
buying allegiance and affecting geostrategic interests rather than building quality 
institutions and promoting lasting economic growth. The magnitude of current aid 
programs has overwhelmed Afghanistan’s institutional capacity and the nation today 
remains a highly corrupt and patronage based society. Natural resource revenue, like 
foreign aid, has the potential to degrade the state-society contract, spur rent-seeking 
behavior, and incite conflict. These phenomena are more likely to occur in nations with 
weak institutions and compounded by preexisting conflict. While Large-scale mining in 
Afghanistan has the potential to become a leading industrial sector, improvements in 
governance and institutional quality are necessary before resource revenue can become 
the driver for long-term sustained growth. 
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V. AFGHANISTAN’S RESOURCES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
“Men of fat and fertile soil, are most commonly effeminate and cowards; where 
as contrariwise, a barren country makes men temperate by necessity, and by consequence 
careful, vigilant, and industrious.”  
—Jean Bodin, Six Books of a Commonwealth, 1576    
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter provides an overview of the current extractive industry in 
Afghanistan as well as the potential and feasibility for future development. Specifically, 
the aim is to describe the resources in terms of quantity, quality, and diversity, and to 
explain the realities and obstacles to mineral extraction within the country. There are 
several keys to developing Afghanistan’s natural resource sector. These include 
establishing support infrastructure, attracting foreign investment, and stabilizing political 
institutions. The Afghan Ministry of Mines is the primary mechanism for coordinating 
efforts between various government bureaucracies and the international community; its 
role is therefore vital to successful development of the nation’s extractive industry. The 
following section evaluates these important efforts and mechanisms, and highlights 
important measures undertaken by the MoM and the Government of Afghanistan.          
B. IDENTIFIED RESOURCES  
Media reports began surfacing mid 2010 after the Pentagon released a memo 
announcing the discovery of $1 trillion worth of minerals sunken below Afghan soil. The 
impetus for the Pentagon press release was the culmination of a joint investigation by the 
United States Geological Survey (USGS) and the Afghan Geological Survey (AGS) that 
assessed the mineral potential of much of the region. While this was the first time the 
West was made privy to Afghanistan’s natural resource potential, the USGS and AGS 
cannot claim pioneer status in the discovery realm; they merely continued work on 
decades old Soviet inquests.  
Although $1 trillion is an alluring figure it’s not a fair or accurate assessment of 
Afghanistan’s resource potential. In a perfect world, where friction and transaction costs 
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were nil, if Afghanistan were able to bring the entirety of their mineral wealth to market, 
it may very well fetch them $1 trillion or more. The reality in Afghanistan is far from 
perfect however. There are multiple factors that make the $1 trillion figure a poor 
measure of the potential mineral value. First, even in a stable and modern country such as 
the U.S., mining operations never exploit all the target material from a mining site. 
Extracting every last bit of resource from the ground would be cost prohibitive. This is 
why ore grade, tonnage, and soil composition are important figures to the mining 
industry. These statistics determine how easy a given mineral can be extracted from the 
ground. Depending on the difficulty, a point along the extraction process will be met 
where it no longer makes economic sense to continue the recovery operation. For some 
deposits, it doesn’t make economical sense to even break ground.119 
Seen in this light, it becomes clear that the dollar figure placed on Afghanistan’s 
resources should be viewed skeptically. The good news is that many of the surveyed 
areas contain high enough grade ore ratios that, all things being equal, they are 
considered exploitable. Several areas, such as the Mes Aynak copper mine 30 KM south 
of Kabul, are categorized as “world class” due to their tonnage and material grade 
reports.120 The USGS assesses 12.3 million metric tons (MMT) of copper are recoverable 
from Mes Aynak alone. Other impressive finds include Haji Gak in Bamiyan province, 
projected to hold 2 a billion metric tons (BMT) of iron, and mines in Zabul and Western 
Ghazni that have measured 1,780 kg of readily exploitable gold deposits.121 All totaled 
there are currently 22 priority mineral sites in Afghanistan.122  
Though the large-scale deposits garner the majority of the attention, the Afghan 
MoM website currently lists 221 mining contracts, the vast majority of which are small 
scale private Afghan operations extracting gravel and construction material.123 Beyond 
                                                
119 Matt Boyd, “IDC Desk Note -  Appraisal of Mining Opportunities in Afghanistan,” Information 
Dominance Center, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 14, 2011. 
120 John Schroder, “Afghanistan’s development and functionality: Renewing a collapsed state,” 
GeoJournal 70, no. 2–3, (October 2007): 94, doi:10.1007/s10708-008-9132-1. 
121 Ibid., 96. 
122 Jeffrey Reeves, “Mining in Afghanistan,” Issues, no. 99 (June 2012), ProQuest 1022982077. 
123 Ibid. 
 51 
the officially recognized sites, Afghanistan is awash with informal and illicit mineral 
extraction, which feeds a vast smuggling network run by regional strongmen and criminal 
networks.124 Many of these sites have existed for decades and their informal standing is a 
product of dearth government capacity and 30 years of an evolving war economy, where 
various factions within the country have exploited natural resources fund their causes.   
C. SUPPORT INFRASTRUCTURE  
While the quality and quantity of rock is good news, Afghanistan lacks the 
government competence and support infrastructure to extract and transport this material 
on a commercial scale. Mines need robust transportation networks and vast sums of water 
and electricity to operate. Unfortunately for Afghanistan 30 years of continuous war has 
diminished an already weak industrial base, which has relegated the country to one of the 
worlds worst in terms of infrastructure. A modern mining sector is almost nonexistent. 
Historically artisanal mines have been the only show in Afghanistan for good reason.125 
Currently only 18% of Afghans have electricity - with the bulk of those receiving power 
being Kabul residents.126 Although the U.S. Department of State website now boasts 
2,000 km of paved roads in Afghanistan, much of this distance is attributed to the ring 
road venture that connects major population centers around the country. Major highways 
capable of supporting heavy tractor-trailers to and from remote mining operations would 
have to be built from scratch at a high expense. Construction cost varies heavily 
depending on terrain and road type; the average cost per kilometer in Afghanistan comes 
in at $548,000 according to USAID. On the high end, the road to Kabul Airport ran $1.6 
million per kilometer.127 
A national railway, or lack there of, is another issue. The heavy metals copper and 
iron ore that comprise the bulk of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth require a reliable rail 
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system to exploit the raw material and deliver it to market. Currently the only rail line 
that exists in Afghanistan is a 75km stretch between Uzbekistan and Mazar-i-Sharif in the 
northern reaches of the country. A railway capable of servicing the entire country, 
including major natural resource areas, would have to cover 3,000 miles of undulating 
terrain, span gorges, and pierce 16,000-foot mountain ranges. Understandably an 
undertaking of this sort comes with a massive price tag - $54 billion according to a report 
by the U.S. Department of Defense.128 To meet these infrastructure needs and raise the 
large amounts of capital described above requires both time and a buy-in from major 
companies willing to support the effort. This buy-in unfortunately reduces the 
profitability across the board for any would be prospectors, while at the same time 
increasing the bargaining power foreign companies wield during the contracting process. 
Together these two realities empower outside forces to call the shots on resource 
extraction feasibility and the timetables for production.    
International Interest 
Despite the lack of infrastructure there is still plenty of international attention in 
Afghanistan’s mining sector. The swirl of excitement however, must be viewed through a 
geo-strategic lens since more than profit margins are at play. A closer look at the 
principle countries involved raises a question of motive. China, India, the United States, 
and Russia are a few of the nations that are bidding for a piece of Afghan soil. The 
highest profile contract, the Mes Aynak copper mine went to the Chinese consortium 
China Metallurgic Group (MCC) in 2007 after it pledged $3.5 billion to develop the area. 
Plans included construction of a rail spur, power plant, and relocation of displaced 
locals.129 An Indian consortium, Steel Authority of India limited (SAIL), has snapped up 
another world-class site, the Haji Gak iron ore deposit in Bamiyan. To enhance its 
bidding status, SAIL vowed to fund $10.8 billion worth of projects in Haji Gak including 
a steel plant, an 800 megawatt power plant, and 200km of rail.130  
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The U.S. foray into the Afghan mining sector is far more modest compared to the 
state backed ventures of China and India, but is still driven by national security interests 
and strategic goals. The U.S. initiative, a J.P. Morgan backed gold mine in Qara Zaghan, 
can trace its birth to Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Paul Brinkley, head of the 
Taskforce for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) team transferred to 
Afghanistan by the Pentagon. It was evident in 2009 that a vital component to a U.S. exit 
strategy was a functioning and somewhat self-sufficient Afghan economy. General David 
Petraeus, U.S. Central Command at the time, prodded Brinkley to apply his lauded 
development approach in Iraq to the Afghan campaign. Once surrounded by industry 
experts, Brinkley became convinced that large private Western companies would not 
jump into the game until small-wildcat operators could show viability.131 A gold mine 
venture was chosen specifically because it is a simple enough operation to succeed in 
spite of Afghanistan’s lack of infrastructure.  
Gold is relatively easy to retrieve from the soil compared to copper or iron and 
much more transportable once topside. In all reality, the gold mine is actually a tiny 
venture for J.P. Morgan—at $50 million it’s almost token.132 Despite this, the deal nearly 
fell apart at the last minute when private investors realized a profitable venture was 
becoming less likely. It was only through intense Pentagon pressure and additional tax 
allowances on the Afghan side that the deal was signed. It still remains to be seen 
whether politics or profit was the central aim of the Qara Zaghan venture, but it is clear 
that without Department of Defense pressure, purely private companies would have shied 
away from the from the adverse risk/reward nature of the current Afghan mining sector. 
Government Challenges and Responsibilities  
The wide spectrum of extraction operations in Afghanistan, ranging from small-
scale artisanal outfits to mega tenders, requires a corresponding range of extraction 
strategies in order for the country to fully capitalize on its resource wealth. For the larger 
projects that require foreign capital to get off the ground, the nation must first create a 
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favorable investment environment. According to Tamin Asey, an economist and prior 
director of the Afghan MoM, “When you go to a conference, the No. 1 question is not 
security for investors, it’s the political and legal stability of the country.”133 Indeed, 
investors need a level of assurance that the political regime they are dealing with will 
remain in power, and that contracts and state legislation are not subject to abrupt 
alteration. Political stability remains a prime yet monumental task for Afghan leaders. 
2014 hosts presidential elections, a foreign military drawdown, and more political 
uncertainty for Afghanistan, a key reason future investment in the mineral sector is static 
and current investors are biding their time before sinking additional funds in the 
country.134 
On the other end of the spectrum, the numerous small-scale and illicit mining 
operations present a separate, yet equally challenging problem for the Afghan 
government. The informal extraction network exists due to lack of government capacity 
to enforce rules and regulations on the extraction and transport of easily acquired 
minerals. The existence of a parallel mining economy presents several barriers to 
progress in Afghanistan. First, illicit extraction of chromite and semiprecious gemstones 
have provided funds to insurgents and non-state actors with disparate political and 
ideological goals.135 Second, much of the illicit material is smuggled out of the country 
thus denying the state valuable tax revenue. Lastly, the primitive nature of informal 
extraction is inherently inefficient—crude techniques often damage and destroy material, 
thereby stripping the state of its full resource potential.  
A set of incentives and deterrence measures are needed in order for the Afghan 
government to formalize the illicit and unofficial mining sector. In his piece, “Does 
Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? A Political Economy of Extraction Framework,” 
Brown University Political Scientist Richard Snyder advances the concept of a “joint 
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extraction” (public-private) process as a viable method for bringing illicit activities into 
the legal fold.136 The idea is for the government to employ a series of carrot-and-stick 
measures such as tax breaks, pay in lieu of harassment, protection from competitors, new 
licit investment opportunities, etc. The key to forging a relationship of joint extraction 
however, is the ability of the government to block the activity in its illicit form. When the 
state is able to do this, the illicit actor’s calculus is reduced to either joint extraction, or 
no extraction.       
D. MINISTRY OF MINES/ANTI GRAFT MEASURES 
The Afghan MoM has a crucial role in courting international investors. According 
to Wahidullah Shahrani, MoM head, “The Ministry of Mines can no longer be the owner 
and operator of mines.”137 In this sense, the MoM has taken a privatization-liberalization 
approach to the development of Afghanistan’s mining sector—relying on private 
companies to provide their own business plans and infrastructure. The ministry has also 
pledged to transfer existing Afghan state run enterprises to the commercial sector. Their 
modus operandi thus far has been to open bids to private enterprises for recognized sites, 
secure contracts for predetermined royalties, and impose flat corporate tax rates.  
Soon after the Mes Aynak deal was struck in 2007, the former MoM director was 
exposed by U.S. officials for accepting a $30 million dollar bribe from MCC 
executives—bad press for an organization desperate for Western investment. As of late 
however, the MoM seems well aware of its tainted image and has since made 
commendable strides to repair damage and move away from systemic corruption of the 
past. The Minister in question was removed and replaced by the current Minister, Mr. 
Shahrani. In a recent appearance during the opening session of an Afghan / Tajik basin 
tender project, Shahrani uttered the word “transparency” four times in a short three 
paragraph statement, obviously aware of his international audience. In 2010 Afghanistan 
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became an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) candidate country. EITI 
promotes global standards through independent robust oversight of government revenue 
accounting.138 Finally, to aid in securing international funding at the July 2012 donor’s 
conference in Tokyo, the MoM published more than 220 mining contracts, which are 
available for public consumption directly from their website. 
Despite these efforts the MoM still fights an uphill battle against corruption and 
Afghan style crony capitalism. The ministry unfortunately does not operate in a vacuum 
but rather is subject to the approval of the Afghan Parliament for vital mining legislation. 
A recent change initiated by the MoM to the current mining legislation—a provision that 
would grant sole exploitation rights to the discovering party—remains stalled in 
bureaucracy. The provision is seen as key to attracting additional foreign investors; its 
hang-up, however, is that infighting is feared between government officials over the 
spoils of the countries natural resource treasure.139  Lastly there is the issue of favoritism. 
While the MoM may have elevated itself above shameless bribery, the patronage system 
still runs deep. India has become a preferred country according to industry officials.140 
This can be seen in proposals recently submitted by SAIL offering an extremely low 1% 
royalty compared to 4% offered by others. Despite this lowball figure India is considered 
the frontrunner for geo-political reasons.141 The Indians and Afghans view this preferred 
relationship as a win-win setup. The Indian government has pledged $2 billion in aid for 
Afghan infrastructure; in turn they get a bigger footprint in the region and discounted 
access to greatly needed raw materials.  
E. POSITIVE INITIATIVES 
Beyond the adoption of EITI standards and the publishing of mining contracts, the 
MoM has additionally taken broader initiatives to leverage the budding extractive 
industry toward greater diversification and sustained growth. Chief among these are the 
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Afghan National and Regional Resource Corridor Program (NRRCP), and the Skills 
Strategy development initiative (SSD), a subprogram of the NRRCP.  
The NRRCP is joint venture undertaken between the Government of Afghanistan 
and the World Bank, with the latter providing funding and oversight. The Afghan 
Ministry of Finance is responsible for funding the program through World Bank loans, 
while the Ministry of Public works, and MoM are responsible for project implementation. 
The idea behind the project is to levy “A sequence of investments and actions to leverage 
a large extractive industry investment in infrastructure, goods and services, into viable 
economic development and diversification along a specific geographic area.”142 The 
NRRCP has been designated a National Priority Program (NPP) by the Afghan 
government.  
Key to the success of the NRRCP is ensuring Afghan citizens are prepared for the 
job opportunities available as the extractive industry develops. The SSD program, in its 
initial stages, is charged with identifying potential demands of the mining sector, and 
devising mechanisms to match future requirements with organic labor and supplies. The 
project’s initial recommendations will inform government officials on where best to 
invest donor money in the skills development sector.143 If successful, the SSD has the 
potential to increase both Afghanistan’s total factor productivity and the capability to 
extract added value from the mining sector.  
F. CONCLUSION 
Afghanistan is a resource rich country possessing a diverse array of minerals and 
hydrocarbons. The country’s extreme landscape and societal unrest however, pose 
significant obstacles to development of the nation’s resource sector. A stable government, 
which is able to coordinate across multiple bureaucratic ministries, is key to attracting the 
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foreign investment and donor aid imperative for development of major mining 
operations. Stability in Kabul is also vital to reestablish authority over small-scale, illicit 
outfits. The MoM has made significant strides in promoting transparency and 
implementing international standards and best practices, yet the ministry remains a 
shining example in an otherwise tumultuous administration.     
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VI. UNLOCKING AFGHANISTAN’S RESOURCE POTENTIAL 
“Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the 
lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice, all the 
rest brought about by the natural course of things.” 
—Adam Smith, economist, 1775  
A. POSITIVE EMPIRICAL INDICATIONS 
The potential for medium and large-scale mining operations within Afghanistan 
has had a positive effect on institutions charged with opening the industry to local and 
international firms. Since 2010 the Afghan Ministry of Mines has revised the country’s 
mining regulations toward international industry standards, joined the EITI, published its 
mining contracts, and dismissed its corrupt former leadership. These positive measures, 
which are a product of the realization that unlocking the potential of Afghanistan’s 
resource abundance requires foreign investment, have had emanated outwards from the 
Ministry of Mines and produced similar results in agencies and institutions adjacent to 
the emerging mining sector.  
Also established in 2010, the Ministry of Finance’s National Priority Program, a 
wholly independent Afghan initiative, indicates a significant move toward a future-
oriented development strategy. Elements crucial to the development of Afghanistan’s 
natural resource sector—skills development, EITI, and the National and Regional 
Resource Corridor programs—are all prominently featured in the Ministry of Finance’s 
National Priority initiative.144 Equally important to note is that the initiative was 
personally introduced by Hamid Karzai, an encouraging sign that leadership in Kabul is 
aware of the importance of inclusive institutions on long-term growth and development. 
B. BINDING CONSTRAINTS  
The most difficult obstacle to the success of Afghanistan’s resource extraction 
sector lies in the political instability of the country. Despite glimmers of optimism, 
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Afghanistan’s social welfare commitments are in their infancy, and the country remains 
politically unstable. The traditionally decentralized form of rule practiced in Afghanistan 
has been most successful when healthy relationships existed between rulers in Kabul and 
powerful elites in the surrounding regions. Decades of civil war and foreign intervention 
however, has severed long standing patronage networks and has upset key center-
peripheral relationships, which has ultimately diminished Kabul’s influence in rural 
Afghanistan. The central government’s lack of influence and legitimacy poses a 
challenge to the implementation of social and economic reforms necessary to convert the 
country’s resource wealth into long-term growth and development.  
A survey of the foreign development aid expended in Afghanistan in the past 12 
years shows that the sheer volume of disbursements created a condition where rent-
seeking often took precedence over productive investment. Put simply, large amounts of 
cash and unstable institutions incentivized many to use funds in unproductive ways rather 
than invest in an uncertain future. While development aid did result in gains in 
infrastructure, many of the projects such as the country’s ring road came with an 
enormous price tag as construction was sub-contracted on multiple levels, with each firm 
collecting fees in return for little productivity.  
This thesis paid particular attention to the application of aid flows in Afghanistan 
to approximate the country’s susceptibility to the resource curse as the nation’s mining 
sector fully emerges. In certain instances aid, and similarly resource revenue, can amount 
to windfall gains, where rents result in dependence and perverse economic incentives. 
While this study found that fiscal and monetary policies were inadequate to handle the 
large amounts of aid in Afghanistan, it also found that there is a critical difference 
between the aid flows in the country and the potential revenue arising from large-scale 
resource extraction. The nature of the resource deposits in Afghanistan make necessary 
investments in both time and infrastructure before large-scale extraction can occur. In this 
sense, resource rents will not have the characteristic of a windfall gain, but rather slow 
and steady revenue. This dynamic lessens the likelihood of Afghanistan falling prey to 
the resource curse. 
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C. QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
This case study comes at crucial point in the Afghan Government’s pursuit of 
economic self-sustainability. The nation’s parliament is currently deciding the future of 
vital mining legislation, the passage of which opens the gate to considerable foreign 
investment. Approval of the bill will signal broad government commitment to long-term 
economic development. As this study has shown, since 2010 policy makers have taken all 
the right steps to ensure the country’s resources will be extracted according to 
international standards and best practices. There is every reason to believe that this trend 
will continue. 
The aim of this thesis was to narrowly focus on the effects of resource abundance 
on government institutions. Exogenous shocks, such as adverse foreign intervention and 
third party spoilers, while in the realm of possibility, were not factored in the analysis of 
Afghanistan’s most likely mineral sector trajectory. Three possible hypotheses were 
presented in the first chapter of this study. Considering the evidence presented, it is clear 
that the Afghan Government has realized its resource potential and has put in place the 
mechanisms to capitalize both on the minerals themselves, and on economic linkages 
associated with the resource sector. Based on this analysis, the most likely hypothesis is 
one in which the resource extractive industry continues to positively affect government 
institutions and drives economic growth in the long term.      
D. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
There are several policy implications for Afghanistan going forward as a result of 
the interplay between natural resources, governance, economic growth, and conflict 
described in this study. The government of Afghanistan and the Ministry of Mines must 
continue to adhere to international standards and best practices in awarding resource 
tenders and structuring contracts for large-scale mining operations. The country must also 
continue to prepare its citizens to take advantage of the business opportunities that will 
become available with the induction of large-scale extraction, processing, and 
transporting of resources. On the international level, transparent business practices must 
be the standard. For certain medium and smaller scale domestic projects however, a given 
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level of patronage may be initially necessary to stabilize relations between Kabul and 
operations in peripheral areas of the nation. To stem the illicit small-scale extraction and 
smuggling networks in the country, the government needs to offer incentives for 
cooperation such as immunity, low initial royalty rates, and property ownership in order 
to bring the informal economy into the legal fold.  
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